Indo-US Nuclear Deal

The unclear deal
By Manvendra Singh

The third attempt in the last decade at unravelling the global nuclear regime seems to be reaching an impasse. But unlike the previous two, the audaciousness of this one has yet to pass the litmus test of domestic politics. And when it comes to influencing foreign policy, domestic politics of the United States of America is overbearing, intriguing, as also perplexingly bi-partisan.

In May 1998, India conducted a series of underground nuclear tests to, ostensibly, begin the process of dismantling the restrictive international nuclear regime. A number of players, domestic and foreign, interpreted it to suit their peculiar, and parochial, agendas. In the process they lost sight of the larger vision behind the testing, and the dismantling. Some years later the United States took the process further by tearing apart the ballistic missile treaty. Naturally most of the world went, well, ballistic, and many did so in India too when there was a cautious, and calculated, welcome given to Washington’s announcement.

Both previous attempts passed the litmus test, global as well as domestic. This time around, however, hurdles seem to appearing. The Indo-US nuclear agreement now faces the crucial test of passing the scrutiny of lawmakers in Washington. And going by the peculiarity of bi-partisan politics in the US, that opposition is also largely bi-partisan. This makes it ever more challenging for the Bush administration, as well as the government of India. For the simple reason that the vast differences in the processes of the two democracies raise concerns about the future shape of the agreement.

In India the executive has full authority to proceed on matters of international foreign policy and security agreements. The legislative wing of governance has little role to play, but for raising the issue in Parliament, or outside. The government need only, as the prime minister has done, inform the House about the decisions.

This is quite unlike the situation prevailing in the US, where both houses of the Congress can raise the matter, and vote on it to either pass or even amend it. So the testing process has gotten underway with various depositions before the two international relations committees of the Congress, and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. The final shape of the agreement as far as the legislature is concerned is, therefore, still up in the air.

The Bush administration is clear in its commitments about the shape of the agreement, and has declared that any amendments moved by the Congress are not binding on it. Numerous US diplomats have driven home this point. So is it a deal then, and a good one at that? Well, yes and no.

The Indo-US agreement has succeeded in its primary objective of shaking global nuclear arrangements. It was long overdue, and will take many more years, and some more treaty tearing to reach the point where it can be said that the international environment is more equitable. For the entire nuclear framework to be renegotiated global conditions have to be more conducive, and diplomacy more dynamic. Both situations are far from being achieved.

As is the wont in all such agreements, the devil is in the details. Nuclear specialists will continue to quibble long after the ink has dried over the separation plan, civil-military lists, breeder reactors, minimum credible deterrent, and capping. The detail that is, however, most worrying for India’s long term plans is the agreement to impose a moratorium on further testing.

Thus far the moratorium was unilateral in nature; declared by former PM Vajpayee on the floor of the House. Now it is a bilateral agreement, between two sovereign states.

And with India always tom-tomming its impeccable record on abiding by agreements, future development of weapons design will be based on 1998 data. Two critical factors appear to question the wisdom of this decision.

Technology is ever evolving and dynamic. So when the Indian promoters of this agreement go to town implying that the Department of Atomic Energy has taken the country for a nuclear ride, then surely they will also raise questions about data derived from the 1998 tests. Which by implication means there are doubts about the agreement sustaining the minimum credible deterrent. This is indeed worrisome.

It is also well known that nuclear weapons are not military but political in nature. In that they are made to impose politico-psychological conditions on the adversary, and not derive military solutions. So when technology is not static, nuclear weapons are political in nature, and politics is as dynamic as technology, will an India in future be able to sustain an unending moratorium on further testing? Indian obsession for technological upgrading, and politics, could well throw a spanner in the wheels of this one.

(The writer is a Lok Sabha MP from Barmer, Rajastha).