1.
The Government must explain clearly this aspect of “safeguards in
perpetuity”. As in Koodankulam, if hereafter, we were to import
nuclear power stations, say from the United States of America, and
import fuel for it, say from Russia, then would that reactor installation
automatically come under “safeguards in perpetuity”?
2.
As ‘perpetual safeguards’ are not applicable to ‘nuclear weapon
states’, how does this now apply to India, when the government has
been asserting the same status as of Nuclear Weapon States? Also
how does this protect India’s nuclear programme as also its strategic
autonomy?
5.
The government must also explain, in detail, commitments made about
the ‘additional protocol’ with the IAEA. What will this additional
protocol involve?
6.
The Prime Minister has used the phrase, in his statement of February
27 “that some other DAE facilities may be added to the list of facilities
within the civilian domain”. This has deliberately been kept vague.
We would like to know whether this includes any fuel fabrication
facilities, such as for example at the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC)
at Hyderabad? or any other of strategic significance?
7.
As the route to safeguards is never straight, this phrase “India
specific safeguards”, with the IAEA confounds. This must be clarified
by the Government.
8.
In the separation plan what is the status of spent fuel?
9.
The principal negotiator, spokesman for the United States, and some
senior senators have asserted that through this Agreement India
has been brought into “closer compliance with international non-proliferation
norms”, for the “first time ever”; in other words, without being
a signatory to the NPT we have accepted the obligations of the NPT.
The Government must clarify.
10.
Has the country diminished, diluted, modified our established commitment
to indigenous development of technology, directly or indirectly,
thus affecting the strategic autonomy of the country?
11.
The government must also explain the absence of ‘sequencing’ and
‘reciprocity’, which had earlier been asserted by the Prime Minister.
12.
We need to know in detail what ‘exit clauses’ if any, have been
built in by the Government should this Agreement not find favour
with the US Congress?
13.
In the newly announced global nuclear energy partnership of the
United States, India has been classified not as a “country with
advanced nuclear technology” but as a “recipient state” in this
partnership. The Government must clarify.
14.
US negotiators have stated that the separation plan has been “jointly”
worked out between the US and official. Is this correct?
15.
There are further assertions that this ‘plan, in detail’, will have
to be submitted to the US congress. Is this correct?
16.
If plans have been discussed in detail, and also negotiated with
the US then the PM must explain his statement of 27 February in
Parliament, that the confidentiality of our strategic programme
has been fully preserved?
17.
The US negotiators have stated that they consistently worked with
the US Congress, Senators and others. How many consultations has
the Government of India had with the Opposition?
18.
There are assertions made by the US, about ‘India’s obligations’
now as part of its adherence to the ‘non-proliferation regime’.
Is this correct? The Government must answer.
19.
What are the consequences of the schedule for separation extending
to 2014?
India’s assertions of being part of the solution, not a problem
appear to have also been compromised by the Government’s handling
of this issue. The Government must, therefore, fully satisfy the
country how our national interests will continue to be fully sub
served. If it is only energy security that persuaded the Government
then clearly emphasis should be on breeding Plutonium, not burning
it. There are disparities in the various statements made, these
cause confusion. It is the duty of the Government to explain fully
and to the total satisfaction of the country. A welcome development
must not become a nightmare of the future through shoddy and inept
implementation.