Way forward in J&K
What about LoC as international border?
By P. C. Dogra

The view of National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan indicating that the LoC can be the basis for a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem is the only pragmatic wayout of the impasse. It would, however, be more fruitful to discuss the issue in historical perspective. Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi continued to stand by their firm conviction that the ceasefire line with some modifications could be converted into an international border.

In April 1956, Nehru disclosed that in May 1955 he had asked his Pakistan counterpart to consider settling the dispute by converting the ceasefire line into a permanent international border. The Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, confirmed that the offer had been made. He also said that Nehru had first broached the idea as early as October 1948 to Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan.

On the eve of the fourth round of talks with Pakistan in 1962, Ambassador MacConaughty handed over a letter from President Kennedy to President Ayub Khan requesting for a “ far more forthcoming and realistic position” and repeated Secretary of State Rusk’s warning that if an opportunity to solve the Kashmir problem was lost “it would seem almost inevitable that the issue for all practical purposes be settled on the basis of the status quo”.

Again when Galbraith, US Ambassador to India, raised the Kashmir issue with Nehru in 1963, the Prime Minister took a hard line against the partition of the valley and wrote to Kennedy, “ I am convinced that these ill-considered and ill-conceived initiatives, however well-intentioned they may be, have at least for the present made it impossible to reach any settlement on this rather involved and complicated question.”

According Philip Ziegler, biographer of Mountbatten, “In 1962, when Mountbatten was in Delhi, he told Nehru that ‘An independent, demilitarised Kashmir was the only solution’ to which Nehru replied: ‘how dangerous any change of the present balance in Kashmir might be for the large Muslim minority in India’.”

In the run-up to the Shimla Agreement, Indira Gandhi was rather keen to convert the ceasefire line into a permanent international border and also impressed upon Bhutto to agree to it. But as Dr. Himayun Khan, former Ambassador of Pakistan to India, says in his book, Diplomatic Divide, “ Mrs Gandhi was impressed by an argument that an imposed solution based on a military victory would mean that Pakistan’s enmity with India would become permanent and defeat the underlying purpose of establishing a durable peace” and Bhutto “ convincingly argued that given enough time, he would be able to bring round public opinion in Pakistan to accepting the present line of control with marginal adjustments as the permanent international border.”

The latest to voice this view is Mr Strobe Talbot, who has mentioned in his book, Engaging India, “The more fundamental problem, as they saw it, was that Pakistanis, while claiming to want American arbitration, would have difficulty accepting the most obvious solution, which is to make the Line of Control a mutually recognised international border and give Kashmiris a significant degree of autonomy within the Indian State. The Indians conversely might actually some day accept that territorial solution, since it would be a ratification of the status quo and they might even be willing to accept special governance arrangements for Kashmir.”

He has further said, “… Jaswant (the then Foreign Minister of India) was prepared to talk about… he mentioned that his government might consider converting the Line of Control, which was based on the 1949 ceasefire line between Pakistani and Indian portions of the territory, into an international boundary — a significant departure from the long established BJP position that India should persist in seeking the integration of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.”

A peace of advice to those Kashmiris wanting to go into the lap of Pakistan: let us recapitulate the views of Sheikh Abdullah about Pakistan. In 1949, Mr Gundevia, who was then Joint Secretary of the then Commonwealth Relations Department, stated in “On Sheikh Abdullah —-A Monograph” that when questioned as to “Why don’t you suggest that Kashmir should be an independent country, with its territorial integrity guaranteed by both India and Pakistan”, the Sheikh replied: “No. This would never work. Pakistan has taught us a lesson. Kashmir is too small and too poor. Pakistan would swallow us up. They have tried it once: they would do it again.”

Our leadership should not ignore history. After meeting Ayub Khan, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a cable to President Kennedy that the “entire conversation was marked by Ayub’s deap fear, distrust and hatred of India and especially the Brahmin Nehru whom he regards as an evil and a dangerous man.” Later after Rusk returned to Washington, he commented, “ We cannot rely on Pakistan to act rationally…”

Again quoting Mr Talbot, “Musharraf found the Lahore Summit galling…. Like so many of his fellow officers and for that matter, many of his countrymen, he was a revanchist on the issue of Kashmir. He also nurtured an underlying bitterness over the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, in which India had played a powerful role in support of Bangladeshi secession. He had told Indian classmate at the Royal College of Defence Studies in 1990 that the only way there could be peace between the two countries if Pakistan recovered its lost territory and lost honour. He yearned, he said, for the day when he would be in a position to launch a military campaign across the Line of Control.”

We must nor forget the Kargil incursion also. Again, as Mr Talbot says, “Subsequent enquiries, conducted by the Indians but credited by the United States, established that the Pakistani thrust was more than just a serendipitous exploitation of the winter stand down; it was a preplanned probe mounted by the Pakistani military and intended to create a new Line of Control more favourable to Pakistan”.

However, peace in the subcontinent is in the interest of everyone. We cannot continue with the prejudices of the past. Let us begin afresh. The Prime Minister’s suggestion of establishing common institutions across the Line of Control is on the lines of the Good Friday Agreement arrived at in April 1998 between the British government, Northern Ireland and the warring factions of the Unionists, wanting to continue to be a part of the UK, and the Nationalists, fighting for its secession and merger with the Irish Republic. The second part of the agreement was the creation of the institutional framework of cross-border linkages and cooperation. It provides for a North-South Ministerial Council, comprising ministers from the autonomous Government of Northern Ireland and their counterparts from the Republic of Ireland. Its task is to explore and develop cooperation in those areas which can yield benefit to both sides, thus enunciating some kind of a confederal setup in their politico-executive decision-making processes.

Certainly, the statement of the Prime Minister and that of the National Security Adviser can become the basis for further negotiations.

The writer is a former Director-General of Police, Punjab.